Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?

Brent Ambrose, Michael LaCour-Little and Anthony Sanders

Journal of Financial Services Research, 2005, vol. 28, issue 1, 113-133

Keywords: Banks; debt; securitization; regulatory capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (114)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10693-005-4358-2

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