An Anonymous Buyer of Intangible Property

Yoichi Nishihara ()

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2014, vol. 14, issue 4, 518 pages

Abstract: In a market for ideas, an intermediary often masks buyers’ information that is not to be exposed to the public. This article shows that such obscuration plays an important role in removing excess inertia because it prevents the emergence of a bandwagon effect among buyers. This model applies to outsourcing-type R&D competition. Although innovation is spurred, welfare implications are ambiguous because the competition among buyers becomes harsher than it is in the absence of the intermediary. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Innovation; Bandwagon effect; Noise; L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-013-0173-x

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