R&D and Social Inefficiency of Entry

Leonard Wang (), Angela Chao and Jen-yao Lee

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2015, vol. 15, issue 2, 187 pages

Abstract: In this paper, we allow the firms non-cooperatively but simultaneously to choose the R&D investment and output in different stages of the game with knowledge spillovers and show that when the deliberate decision of the firms on its R&D investment is acknowledged, entry is socially excessive. Our result has important implication for competition policy. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: R&D; Excessive entry; Insufficient entry; L13; L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-014-0180-6

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