Vertical Relations in the Presence of Competitive Recycling
Liliane Giardino-Karlinger ()
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2016, vol. 16, issue 1, 25-49
This paper studies the vertical relations between a manufacturer and one or more retailers over two periods in the presence of a competitive recycling sector. In a bilateral monopoly, two-part tariffs are always efficient, i.e. the manufacturer will produce the joint-profit-maximizing output. Under downstream oligopoly, instead, retailers compete to acquire the recycled good which allows the recycling sector to appropriate some of the industry profits. Under two-part tariffs, the manufacturer has an incentive to distort her output choices to reduce this rent loss: She will discriminate among her retailers, and she will either overproduce in the second period or underproduce in the first period. Vertical restraints that restore profit maximization (e.g. loyalty rebates) will harm consumers whenever the manufacturer would overproduce otherwise. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016
Keywords: Vertical relations; Durable good; Downstream competition; L12; L14; L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Vertical Relations in the Presence of Competitive Recycling (2016)
Working Paper: Vertical Relations in the Presence of Competitive Recycling (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jincot:v:16:y:2016:i:1:p:25-49
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