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Protective Excise Taxation

Michele Santoni ()

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2017, vol. 17, issue 4, No 4, 445 pages

Abstract: Abstract In a small open economy composed of unionised international Cournot-Nash duopolies, a self-interested government has unilateral incentives to set higher specific domestic excise duties under the destination principle when the typical foreign firm is dominant and the import-competing sector is small. Excise taxes may emerge in political equilibrium when domestic firms and unions lobby for protection and the government is unable to use alternative protective policies because of international agreements. In so far as the government is prepared to exchange tax revenues for political contributions, under some conditions the excise tax rate will be higher than the one chosen without lobbying.

Keywords: Excise taxation; Protectionism; Unionised international oligopoly; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D72 F16 H22 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-017-0244-5

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