Contract Enforcement and Trade
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2018, vol. 18, issue 1, 107-119
Abstract The main objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of contract enforcement on trade in a large sample of developing economies. The effects of three separate measures capturing contract enforcement (the time required to enforce a contract; the costs to enforce a contract; and the number of procedures required to enforce a contract) on trade were tested using the panel corrected standard errors method of estimation. The results show that the three measures of contract enforcement are negatively and statistically significantly correlated with trade. The findings lead to the conclusion that the ease of contract enforcement is crucial in order to facilitate the speed of trade in the developing group of countries.
Keywords: Trade; Contract; Enforcement; Costs; Developing countries; F13; F14; K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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