Strategic Compatibility Choice, Network Alliance, and Welfare
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2018, vol. 18, issue 2, 245-252
Abstract Based on a simple model of compatibility choice under differentiated Cournot duopoly with network externalities, we consider how the levels of a network externality and product substitutability affect the choice of compatibility. In particular, if the level of network externality is larger than that of product substitutability, there are multiple equilibria involving imperfect and perfect compatibility. Furthermore, we demonstrate the conditions for constructing such a network alliance so that firms provide perfectly compatible products. The network alliance is stable and socially optimal.
Keywords: Compatibility; Network externality; Fulfilled expectation; Cournot duopoly; Horizontally differentiated product; Network alliance; D21; D43; D62; L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Strategic compatibility choice, network alliance, and welfare (2017)
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