Economics at your fingertips  

Environmental Technological Choice in a Cournot-Bertrand Model

Elias Asproudis () and Eleftherios Filippiadis ()
Additional contact information
Elias Asproudis: University of Swansea
Eleftherios Filippiadis: University of Macedonia

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2021, vol. 21, issue 1, No 3, 43-58

Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the abatement technology choice in Cournot-Bertrand, as well as in pure Cournot and Bertrand duopolies. It is argued that, under certain conditions, the Bertrand firm will choose a “dirtier” technology compared to its Cournot rival. Furthermore, when competing in quantities, firms choose greener technologies than when competing in prices. This is because higher abatement rates make a firm choosing quantity relatively more aggressive than a firm choosing price, irrespective of the strategic variable of its rival. Moreover, it is shown that the introduction of abatement technologies will increase total output in the market and decrease total emissions.

Keywords: Oligopoly theory; Environment; Technological choice; Competition; Cournot-Bertrand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 L13 Q5 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/10842/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10842-020-00339-z

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade is currently edited by Karl Aiginger, Marcel Canoy and Michael Peneder

More articles in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Page updated 2022-05-12
Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:21:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10842-020-00339-z