Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey

Switgard Feuerstein

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2005, vol. 5, issue 3, 163-198

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of infinitely repeated games, and in particular, to survey the comprehensive literature exploring which factors make collusion easier or more difficult to sustain. On this basis, the existing empirical studies and the experimental results will be discussed. Policy options as e.g. leniency programs are also analyzed. Although the number of clear cut policy conclusions is limited, understanding thoroughly the mechanisms of collusion is important for (anti-trust) policies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: collusion; capacity constraints; international oligopolies; competition policy; leniency programs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10842-005-4868-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:163-198

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/10842/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10842-005-4868-5

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade is currently edited by Karl Aiginger, Marcel Canoy and Michael Peneder

More articles in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().