Collusion in Industrial Economics: A Comment

Robert Porter

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2005, vol. 5, issue 3, 234 pages

Abstract: This note comments on Feuerstein's (2005) summary of the literature on collusion in infinitely repeated games. It specifically addresses firm asymmetries and settings in which punishments can be asymmetric. Changes in competition policy such as exception from punishment for the first but only the first compliant and the recent practice to study the effects of mergers after the fact, will provide interesting material for testing the theoretical predictions. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: cartel; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-005-4873-8

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