Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Rejoinder
Switgard Feuerstein ()
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2005, vol. 5, issue 3, 235-239
This rejoinder responds to some issues raised in the comments to my survey on collusion. The focus is on different assumptions on the punishment phase and on some aspects of competition policy. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
Keywords: collusion; optimal punishment; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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