Infant Firm Subsidization in Industries with Dynamic Structure

Vladimir Petkov ()

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2007, vol. 7, issue 2, 73-93

Abstract: This paper analyzes time-consistent subsidies in industries with strong learning effects and frequent entry and exit. Structural dynamics create opportunities for strategic behavior: by influencing government policies, infant firms can reduce their tax burden and weaken future competitors. Two balanced-budget subsidy regimes are considered: (1) intra-industry redistribution; and (2) outside funding. We show that the choice of funding method does not affect equilibrium welfare. In both cases, the regulator is able to attain the constrained optimum. This result does not depend on the functional form of payoffs and holds in both price and quantity games. In linear-quadratic examples, we compute the equilibrium strategies. We show that (1) government intervention amplifies transitional price and output fluctuations and (2) the steady-state subsidy rate and infant production are decreasing in the speed of learning. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: learning-by-doing; regulation; Markov-perfect equilibrium; linear-quadratic games; L50; L13; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jincot:v:7:y:2007:i:2:p:73-93

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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-007-0004-z

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