Do the contingencies of external monitoring, ownership incentives, or free cash flow explain opposing firm performance expectations?

Peter Wright (), Mark Kroll (), Ananda Mukherji () and Michael Pettus ()

Journal of Management & Governance, 2009, vol. 13, issue 3, 215-243

Keywords: Agency theory; Resource allocation; Free cash flow; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-008-9063-8

Journal of Management & Governance is currently edited by Lino Cinquini

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