Delistings and the costs of governance: a study of European stock exchanges 1996–2004

Steen Thomsen () and Frederik Vinten ()

Journal of Management & Governance, 2014, vol. 18, issue 3, 793-833

Abstract: In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in delistings from stock exchanges in the US and Europe, and this trend has been partly attributed to increasing administrative costs in listed companies. Has corporate governance regulation gone too far? We examine delistings from European stock exchanges 1996–2004 and find that standard corporate governance regulation—like investor protection and corporate governance codes—is associated with more delistings and in particularly going private transactions. In contrast, the tendency to go private is found to be lower, when the quality of overall governance is high. The results continue to hold when we take into consideration that governance policy may be endogenous. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Delisting; Public listing; Transaction costs; Mergers; Acquisitions; Bankruptcy; Liquidation; Going private; Private equity; Investor protection; G14; G15; G18; G24; G32; G33; G34; G38; K20; K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-013-9256-7

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