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Intraday market liquidity, corporate governance, and ownership structure in markets with weak shareholder protection: evidence from Brazil and Chile

Diego Cueto () and Lorne Switzer ()

Journal of Management & Governance, 2015, vol. 19, issue 2, 395-419

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of very highly concentrated ownership structures on the liquidity of stock markets in a context of weak protection for minority shareholders. Such structures are prevalent in a number of European markets as well as in various developing markets, as opposed to US markets. Two alternative hypotheses are tested. The shareholder expropriation hypothesis predicts an inverse relationship between liquidity and ownership concentration for the dominant shareholder. The dominant monitor-insider hypothesis contends that dominant shareholders are not detrimental to market liquidity, since they have incentives to reduce their costs of exit and/or to improve the information transfer of their value enhancing activities to markets. Our empirical results are more consistent with the latter. We find that alternative governance mechanisms also have liquidity enhancing effects for Brazilian and Chilean firms. In particular, cross-listing in the US market and the threat of outside takeovers serve as monitoring devices to reduce informational asymmetries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Corporate governance; Ownership concentration; Liquidity; Emerging markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-013-9263-8

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