External audit and goodwill write-off

Silvia Ferramosca (), Giulio Greco () and Marco Allegrini ()
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Silvia Ferramosca: University of Pisa
Giulio Greco: University of Pisa
Marco Allegrini: University of Pisa

Journal of Management & Governance, 2017, vol. 21, issue 4, No 5, 907-934

Abstract: Abstract Building on agency theory, we investigate whether and how salient external auditor characteristics (size, audit fees, non-audit fees, tenure) impact on the reported goodwill write-off. We use a sample of US firms applying SFAS 142. We find that Big-4 auditors are more prone to limit underestimated write-offs rather than overestimated write-offs and that auditors require higher fees from companies underestimating the write-offs. The findings are consistent with the auditors’ preference for more conservative goodwill and earnings values, which reduce their litigation and reputation costs. This preference can converge with the managerial interest to use unnecessary overestimated goodwill write-offs for earnings management purposes (e.g. to smooth the income or take big baths). Our findings do not support the hypotheses that non-audit fees and tenure affect the goodwill write-off. Our paper contributes to prior literature on external audit and financial accounting choices. Our study suggests that leniently audited discretional fair value estimates are likely to compromise the role of auditing (and of financial reporting) as an external control mechanism. Our study can contribute to the current policy debate around goodwill accounting.

Keywords: Goodwill write-off; SFAS 142; Fair value; External audit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-016-9369-x

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