Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion

Rodrigo Basco (), Thomas Bassetti, Lorenzo Dal Maso () and Nicola Lattanzi ()
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Rodrigo Basco: American University of Sharjah
Lorenzo Dal Maso: Alma Mater Studiorum – University of Bologna
Nicola Lattanzi: IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca

Journal of Management & Governance, 2023, vol. 27, issue 1, No 5, 130 pages

Abstract: Abstract This article explores the complex relationship between family firms and talent management practices. We use an international sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms to show that the relationship between family-owned firms and investment in talent management practices is mediated by the firm's level of risk aversion, which is, in turn, moderated by industry competition. Risk-averse family-owned firms tend to invest less in talent management practices when industry competition is weak. In contrast, when competition increases, family-owned firms tend to invest in talent as much as non-family-owned firms do.

Keywords: Talent management; Family ownership; Risk aversion; Moral hazard; Adverse selection; Industry competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1

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