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Increasing shareholder focus: the repercussions of the 2015 corporate governance reform in Japan

Paweł Mielcarz (), Dmytro Osiichuk () and Karolina Puławska ()
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Paweł Mielcarz: Kozminski University
Dmytro Osiichuk: Kozminski University
Karolina Puławska: Kozminski University

Journal of Management & Governance, 2023, vol. 27, issue 3, No 14, 1017-1047

Abstract: Abstract The corporate governance reform promulgated in 2015 in Japan has contributed to a substantial increase of board independence and a reduction of average board tenure. Our empirical analysis covering 3405 public companies demonstrates that reinvigorated corporate oversight and an increasing post-reform shift towards prioritization of shareholder value have led to a persistent increase of corporate profitability, asset productivity, dividend payouts, acquisitions’ value, and valuation multiples. We also document a significant increase of sensitivity of executives’ and directors’ compensations to the dynamics of firms’ bottom lines. The positive changes are the most pronounced within companies where independent directors constitute a majority on the board. The most notable drawbacks of the reform are a significant reduction in net employment creation and in employee turnover within the largest companies. These might be a possible reason for the documented improvement in corporate performance. The number of part-time employees has also seen a significant increase. While being prima facie focused on reinvigorating the private sector, the corporate governance reform may implicitly undermine the established social contract based on job security. Therefore, our study is important from the perspective of sustainable development of the corporate sector as it demonstrates that while concentrating on improving corporate governance, it is also necessary to consider the business’ social responsibility.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Board independence; Profitability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10997-021-09619-0

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