Rational Inefficiencies

Peter Bogetoft and Jens Hougaard ()

Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2003, vol. 20, issue 3, 243-271

Abstract: In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Keywords: efficiency; preferences; incentives; bargaining; planning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (47)

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Working Paper: Rational Inefficiencies (2001)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1027347616038

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