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A Test of the Signaling Value of IPO Underpricing with REIT IPO-SEO Pairs

Chinmoy Ghosh, Raja Nag and C F Sirmans

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2000, vol. 20, issue 2, 137-54

Abstract: The asymmetric information hypothesis states that IPO underpricing signals superior firm value. During the post-IPO period, the market learns the firm's true worth such that good quality firms issue seasoned equity at favorable prices and recoup the loss sustained at IPO. Since REITs have no special incentive to issue debt because of their tax-exempt status, and since they must pay out 95 percent of net income as dividends, REIT managers are hard pressed to raise capital through seasoned equity. Consequently, the signaling link between IPOs and SEOs is critical for REITs. Consistent with the signaling model, we find strong evidence that (1) REITs that underprice IPOs more are likely to sell seasoned equity sooner, (2) higher IPO underpricing results in larger joint amount of capital raised through an IPO-SEO pair, and (3) firms that underprice IPOs underprice SEOs as well. IPO underpricing does not mitigate the valuation loss associated with seasoned offerings, however. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics is currently edited by Steven R. Grenadier, James B. Kau and C.F. Sirmans

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