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The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Citing Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate Than Supporters?

Carol Mansfield, George Van Houtven and Joel Huber

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2001, vol. 22, issue 2-3, 61 pages

Abstract: Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the community, especially when the facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by the company siting the facility. Why have opponents of these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This article presents evidence that opponents of siting proposals are much more likely to vote or engage in other collective action, while supporters are more likely to remain passive and not take action to advance their position. The results suggest that political mechanisms for determining host communities for facilities such as town meetings or referenda may not accurately represent the preferences of the community and that opportunities for siting may be missed. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2001
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The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics is currently edited by Steven R. Grenadier, James B. Kau and C.F. Sirmans

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