Politics In A Dynamic View Of Land-Use Regulations: Of Interest Groups And Homevoters

William Fischel ()

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2005, vol. 31, issue 4, 397-403

Abstract: The nature of land-use regulation differs by type of jurisdiction. Regulatory politics at the local level is the major source of the dynamic consistency problem. Courts are reluctant to enforce the regulatory commitments of previous officials at all levels of government, but the alternative political and reputation constraints on official promise-keeping are most problematic at the local level. Local majoritarianism presents the greatest challenge to attempts to improve the dynamic efficiency of land-use regulation. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s11146-005-3289-x

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