The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Structure of REIT Boards of Directors

Magdy Noguera ()

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2012, vol. 45, issue 4, 869-887

Abstract: The changes in the board structure for REITs for the period 1999–2005 are presented. Post-SOX REIT boards have changed primarily in the form of greater independence, as fewer REIT boards are led by their CEOs due to SOX. In the relation between Post-SOX board structure and performance, the results show no improvement in performance for REITs whose boards have a majority of preferred features. That is, REITs with small boards, majority of outside directors, and not led by their CEOs do not perform better than their counterparts. These results provide additional fuel for the debate on the benefits and costs of SOX. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Board structure; Corporate governance; the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; REIT performance; G30; G34; G38; K22; M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11146-011-9303-6

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