Client Externality Effects of Agents Selling Their Own Properties

Xun Bian (), Geoffrey K. Turnbull () and Bennie D. Waller ()
Additional contact information
Xun Bian: Longwood University
Geoffrey K. Turnbull: University of Central Florida
Bennie D. Waller: Longwood University

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2017, vol. 54, issue 2, No 1, 139-164

Abstract: Abstract This study is the first to examine the principal-agent issues surrounding how agents’ efforts to sell their own properties affect their efforts to sell concurrently listed client properties. The principal-agent model shows that listed agent-owned properties induce agents to worker harder over all, but diminish effort dedicated to marketing concurrently listed client properties, leading to reduced liquidity and/or lower selling prices for those properties. The empirical results show that client properties competing with agent-owned properties remain on the market 30 to 46 % longer and sell for 1.8 % less than properties whose agents have no such conflict of interest.

Keywords: Principal/Agent conflict; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11146-015-9543-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:54:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11146-015-9543-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11146/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11146-015-9543-y

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics is currently edited by Steven R. Grenadier, James B. Kau and C.F. Sirmans

More articles in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().