 The Value of Control: Evidence from Full and Partial Acquisitions in the Real Estate IndustryFayez A Elayan and Philip J Young The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 1994, vol. 8, issue 2, 167-82 Abstract: We investigate the differential wealth effects of (1) full and partial control acquisitions, (2) nonreal estate, real estate and REIT participants, and (3) single- and multiple-bidder events. We find that target firms earn positive excess returns at the announcement of partial and full acquisitions, but acquisitions that result in control earn larger excess returns than noncontrol acquisitions. An examination of industry differences shows that real estate firms or REITs do not earn higher returns relative to nonreal estate firms. Our analysis of market structure finds that bidders that are not involved in an acquisition program earn greater announcement period returns than prior acquirers. For target firms, we find that those with a single offer earn higher returns than those with subsequent offers. A cross-sectional regression analysis shows that while market structure is important in explaining returns, the main determining factor for target firms is the degree of control sought. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers Date: 1994 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:8:y:1994:i:2:p:167-82 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics is currently edited by Steven R. Grenadier, James B. Kau and C.F. Sirmans More articles in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics from Springer |
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