Probabilities and Beliefs

Edi Karni

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1996, vol. 13, issue 3, 249-62

Abstract: Choice-theoretic definitions of subjective probabilities originated with the work of Ramsey and de Finetti and attained their definitive form in the work of Savage. These probabilities are intended to provide a numerical representation of a decision maker's beliefs regarding the likely realization of alternative events. In this article, I argue that the choice-theoretic definitions of subjective probabilities involve a tacit convention--namely, state-independent utility functions--that is not implied by the axioms, and, as a consequence, choice-theoretic subjective probabilities, even when they exist, do not necessarily represent the decision makers' beliefs. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:13:y:1996:i:3:p:249-62

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11166/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty is currently edited by W. Kip Viscusi

More articles in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().