Fragile Redistribution Choices behind a Veil of Ignorance

Ed Bukszar and Jack Knetsch

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1997, vol. 14, issue 1, 63-74

Abstract: Prescription dealing with redistribution questions are often influenced by the presumption that individuals behind a veil of ignorance will choose rules that lead to a greater equality of outcomes. However, such preferences may be fragile and dependent on particular circumstances. To the extent that initial distributions are seen to be deserved, for example, people may not choose to impose losses on some individuals to confer benefits on others. A series of tests in which individuals chose between alternative distribution rules under circumstances approximating a veil of ignorance showed large differences in redistribution preferences. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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