How much ambiguity aversion?
Ken Binmore,
Lisa Stewart and
Alex Voorhoeve ()
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2012, vol. 45, issue 3, 215-238
Abstract:
Experimental results on the Ellsberg paradox typically reveal behavior that is commonly interpreted as ambiguity aversion. The experiments reported in the current paper find the objective probabilities for drawing a red ball that make subjects indifferent between various risky and uncertain Ellsberg bets. They allow us to examine the predictive power of alternative principles of choice under uncertainty, including the objective maximin and Hurwicz criteria, the sure-thing principle, and the principle of insufficient reason. Contrary to our expectations, the principle of insufficient reason performed substantially better than rival theories in our experiment, with ambiguity aversion appearing only as a secondary phenomenon. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; Ellsberg paradox; Hurwicz criterion; Maximin criterion; Principle of insufficient reason; C91; D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:45:y:2012:i:3:p:215-238
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DOI: 10.1007/s11166-012-9155-3
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