Probabilistic sophistication and reverse Bayesianism

Edi Karni and Marie-Louise Vierø

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2015, vol. 50, issue 3, 189-208

Abstract: This paper extends our earlier work on reverse Bayesianism by relaxing the assumption that decision makers abide by expected utility theory, assuming instead weaker axioms that merely imply that they are probabilistically sophisticated. We show that our main results, namely, (modified) representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that constitute “reverse Bayesianism,” remain valid. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Awareness; Unawareness; Reverse Bayesianism; Probabilistic sophistication; D8; D81; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Probabilistic Sophistication And Reverse Bayesianism (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:50:y:2015:i:3:p:189-208

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DOI: 10.1007/s11166-015-9216-5

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