Spatial externalities and risk in interdependent security games

Stephan Kroll () and Aric P. Shafran ()
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Stephan Kroll: Colorado State University
Aric P. Shafran: California Polytechnic State University

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2018, vol. 56, issue 3, No 2, 237-257

Abstract: Abstract Individuals regularly invest in self-protection to reduce the risk of an adverse event. The effectiveness of self-protection often depends on the actions of other economic agents and can be modeled as a stochastic coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. We use lab experiments to analyze tacit coordination in stochastic games with two kinds of interdependencies in payoffs: “non-spatial” in which every agent’s action has an impact on the risk faced by every other agent, and “spatial” in which agents only impact the risk faced by their immediate neighbors. We also compare behavior in the stochastic games to deterministic versions of the same games. We find that coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium is significantly easier in the deterministic games than in the stochastic games and that spatial interdependencies lead to greater levels of coordination in the deterministic game but not in the stochastic game. The difficulty with coordination observed in the stochastic games has important implications for many real-world examples of interdependent security and also illustrates the importance of not relying on data from deterministic experiments to analyze behavior in settings with risk.

Keywords: Self-protection; Risk mitigation; Experiments; Interdependent security; Coordination game; D81; C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11166-018-9280-8

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