Delegated risk-taking, accountability, and outcome bias

Robert M. Gillenkirch () and Louis Velthuis ()
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Robert M. Gillenkirch: University of Osnabrück
Louis Velthuis: University of Mainz

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2023, vol. 67, issue 2, No 2, 137-161

Abstract: Abstract In a sequence of experiments, this study investigates how people evaluate others who make risky decisions on their behalf, and how such evaluations affect delegated risk-taking. A decision maker acts on behalf of a client who holds the decision maker accountable by way of a subjective evaluation after observing a risky decision’s outcome. If evaluation is biased towards the outcome, it may have dysfunctional effects with respect to delegated risk-taking in that decision makers’ risk choices are increasingly misaligned with their clients’ risk preferences. We find evidence giving support to this conjecture. Across and within three experiments, we test for the effects of different types and degrees of accountability in that we manipulate the information available to clients as well as the consequences which evaluations have for decision makers. Evaluations are biased towards outcomes in all experiments. When evaluations affect decision maker’s compensations, a stronger outcome bias in evaluations translates into risk-taking decisions being less frequently aligned with clients’ risk preferences. In the same situation, giving clients the opportunity to make peer comparisons increases outcome bias. We further find that clients do not hold decision makers accountable for their risk choices when they cannot observe the risk-taking decision, but have to infer it from observing the outcome. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.

Keywords: Risk-taking; Accountability; Outcome bias; Subjective evaluation; Relative outcome information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D91 G41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11166-023-09414-2

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