Implementing and Testing Risk-Preference-Induction Mechanisms in Experimental Sealed-Bid Auctions

Thomas A Rietz

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1993, vol. 7, issue 2, 199-213

Abstract: Risk-preference-inducing lottery procedures can serve as valuable tools for experimental economists. However, questioning their effectiveness, experimenters may avoid them even when predictions and conclusions depend crucially on risk preferences. Here, I review risk-preference-induction attempts in sealed-bid auctions, discussing factors that promote or hinder success. Making the procedure very transparent and having subjects learn about it in simple environments promote success. Hysteresis resulting from switching between monetary payoffs and lottery procedures in one environment hinders success. Thus, lottery procedures appear sensitive to the implementation. However, implemented carefully, they can generate behavior consistent with the intended preferences. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1993
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