A truthful ascending auction mechanism for dynamic allocation of LSA spectrum blocks

Ayman Chouayakh (), Aurélien Bechler (), Isabel Amigo (), Loutfi Nuaymi () and Patrick Maillé ()
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Ayman Chouayakh: Orange Labs
Aurélien Bechler: Orange Labs
Isabel Amigo: IMT Atlantique
Loutfi Nuaymi: IMT Atlantique
Patrick Maillé: IMT Atlantique

Netnomics, 2021, vol. 22, issue 1, 27-52

Abstract: Abstract Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a new sharing approach that aims to optimize the use of the 2.3-2.4 Ghz frequency band in order to support the deployment of 5G systems. Under LSA, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) can share the 2.3-2.4 band with the incumbent of that band under some guarantees, specified in a license attributed by the regulator. In this paper, we focus on ascending auctions to allocate and price licenses. We first show how to implement an ascending version of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in the LSA context, but highlight that it may introduce some computational complexity problems. We therefore propose another ascending mechanism, called C-LSA, based on the clinching approach. We also design the one-shot equivalent (in terms of allocations and payments) of C- LSA that we use to compare the performance of VCG and C-LSA through simulations. Our simulations suggest that C-LSA is an interesting candidate to allocate LSA licenses, since the mechanism yields considerably larger revenues than VCG, for a very limited loss of allocation efficiency (around 4%).

Keywords: Licensed Shared Access; Ascending auctions; Mechanism design; Truthfulness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11066-021-09147-x

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