Incentives for the Expansion of Network Capacity in a “Peering” Free Access Settlement

Roberto Roson

Netnomics, 2003, vol. 5, issue 2, 149-159

Abstract: Abstract The absence of an access fee may hinder the development of capacity in interfaced networks, because the benefits of a larger capacity partly accrue to external consumers. This paper shows, however, that the implied result of under-investment in network capacity may be reversed in a number of circumstances. Different cases are discussed by means of a model, which adopts fairly general assumptions about some key functions. This allows accommodating for a variety of alternative specifications found in the literature.

Keywords: congestion; Internet; investment incentives; network capacity; peering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1026071016638

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