Non-binding sequential exchange between discounting agents

Timothy Mathews ()

Netnomics, 2004, vol. 6, issue 3, 187-208

Abstract: When exchange is sequential, and no binding agreements can be written, the agent acting first is exposed to the possibility that even if he honors the agreement his trading partner might not. Repeated interaction of this nature is modeled. Exchange will successfully occur when there are ample gains from trade for the second agent, implying that the first agent may be better off with less bargaining power. Thus, the first agent may want to bargain at less than his full ability in order to ensure that an otherwise unsuccessful transaction will successfully occur. Additionally, if the first agent can facilitate exchange by hiring an escrow service, he will do so when his bargaining advantage is sufficiently large. Copyright Springer 2004

Keywords: nonsimultaneous exchange; transactional relationships; Internet transactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s11066-005-2304-y

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