e-Honesty: when does it pay?

Georgiy Lyudyno () and Sudipta Sarangi

Netnomics, 2004, vol. 6, issue 3, 209-219

Abstract: We consider a model of strategic reputation for online sales using an exchange format. In the model sellers can sell a cheap good to build up reputation, and then cheat when selling a more expensive good. We identify conditions under which a seller will always be honest. Copyright Springer 2004

Keywords: rating systems; reputation; online sales (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11066-005-2305-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:netnom:v:6:y:2004:i:3:p:209-219

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11066/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11066-005-2305-x

Access Statistics for this article

Netnomics is currently edited by Stefan Voß

More articles in Netnomics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().