 Advances in Dynamic Traffic Assgmnt: TACWen-Long Jin () Networks and Spatial Economics, 2015, vol. 15, issue 3, 617-634 Abstract: Traditionally traffic assignment problems (TAPs) have been formulated as non-cooperative games (NCGs), and Wardrop’s user equilibrium (UE) of a TAP as Nash equilibrium (NE) of the corresponding NCG. In this study, in contrast, we propose a mapping from finite NCGs (F-NCGs) to asymmetric TAPs (A-TAPs) on a two-way or urban network, in which the travel cost of one link depends on flows on other links. With the help of three route-based formulations of UE, we show that NE of an F-NCG is equivalent to UE of the corresponding A-TAP. Based on the new relationship, we extend Nash’s fixed point formulation of NE to prove the existence of static UE. This study provides a more complete picture of the relationships between NCGs and TAPs. In the future we will be interested in studying Nash’s fixed point formulation for dynamic UE. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 Keywords: Asymmetric traffic assignment problems; Wardrop’s user equilibrium; Finite non-cooperative games; Nash equilibrium; Fixed-point formulation; Existence of user equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:netspa:v:15:y:2015:i:3:p:617-634 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s11067-014-9250-x Access Statistics for this article Networks and Spatial Economics is currently edited by Terry L. Friesz More articles in Networks and Spatial Economics from Springer |
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