Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes

Yasushi Masuda () and Akira Tsuji
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Yasushi Masuda: Keio University
Akira Tsuji: Canon Inc.

Networks and Spatial Economics, 2019, vol. 19, issue 1, No 13, 293-318

Abstract: Abstract We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.

Keywords: Congestion game; Priority; Capacitated network; Theme park (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s11067-018-9396-z

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