Market Coordination Under Non-Equilibrium Dynamics
Arnaud Z. Dragicevic ()
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Arnaud Z. Dragicevic: IRSTEA — The Center of Clermont-Ferrand
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2019, vol. 19, issue 3, 697-715
Abstract In order to study the market coordination under non-equilibrium dynamics, such as the one outlined in catallactics, we consider a multi-agent system with fixed topology, based upon a Hamiltonian structure, subject to flocking behavior. The assumptions of market segmentation and of imperfect competition are introduced. We show that the catallactic framework leads to the emergence of a stable market coordination, but is also a dissipative structure of cyclical nature, such that imperfect competition gives rise to a pseudo-competitive market. In case of risk-sharing, we find that catallactics yields an unstable trading system, which transforms the market risk into a systemic risk.
Keywords: Network economics; Agent-based modeling; Catallactics; Flocking behavior; Risk-sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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