Special Issue on Variational Inequalities: Consistent Conjectural Variations Coincide with the Nash Solution in the Meta-Model

Viacheslav Kalashnikov (), Nataliya Kalashnykova () and José G. Flores-Muñiz ()
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Viacheslav Kalashnikov: Tecnologico de Monterrey (ITESM), Campus Monterrey
Nataliya Kalashnykova: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL)
José G. Flores-Muñiz: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL)

Networks and Spatial Economics, 2022, vol. 22, issue 2, No 5, 289-313

Abstract: Abstract We keep investigating the properties of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) developed for a single-commodity oligopoly. Although, in general, the consistent conjectures are distinct from those of Cournot-Nash, in our previous papers, we established the following remarkable fact. Define a meta-model as such where the players are the same agents as in the original oligopoly but now using the conjectures as their strategies. Then the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the meta-model generated the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in the original oligopoly. In this paper, we study the conditions under which the inverse is also true, that it, every consistent CVE provides for the Cournot-Nash optimal strategies for the meta-model. This equivalence allows one to extend the concept of CCVE to other kinds of economic and financial models lacking the oligopoly structure.

Keywords: Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium; Meta-model; Optimal Cournot-Nash strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11067-019-09473-6

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