Reframe policymaking dysfunction through bipartisan-inclusion leadership
John W. Straka () and
Brenda C. Straka ()
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John W. Straka: Model Risk Professional
Brenda C. Straka: Duke University
Policy Sciences, 2020, vol. 53, issue 4, No 9, 779-802
Abstract:
Abstract Persistent policy failures have been examined in recent years with a focus on the role of political systems. We evaluate the growth of dysfunctional policymaking in the U.S. and propose a countering approach. Policy failures often reflect partisan policy stalemate, errors or unintended consequences, polarized extremism or imbalance, or partisan reversals with changes in power. Extremes in partisanship are not new historically, but growing policy failures due to negative partisanship have now severely damaged public trust. More “party blind” conditions in policy formulation may be able to renew a more productive social contract. We propose a disruptive presidential leadership approach of bipartisan inclusion to seek to reframe the partisan divides, counter negative partisanship and extremes, re-establish better policymaking interactions, and improve governance and policy outcomes. Dysfunctional policymaking has been attributed to Republicans and Democrats in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas often lead to higher rates of cooperation, and similarly, historical policymaking included greater cooperation, but in recent decades the bipartisan norms of governance have substantially eroded. We describe three complementary explanations, which suggest that non-cooperative partisan policymaking has become self-reinforcing, and institutional changes to promote cooperation should focus on lowering the risk-adjusted cost–benefit ratio, making cooperation safer and more attractive for policymakers.
Keywords: Government dysfunction; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Zero sum; Polarization; Party loyalty; Stag Hunt; Bipartisan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:policy:v:53:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s11077-020-09383-2
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DOI: 10.1007/s11077-020-09383-2
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