Pioneer advantage or late-mover advantage? An examination of the interplay between policy diffusion sequence and policy outcomes

Xiangning Chen () and Yahua Wang ()
Additional contact information
Xiangning Chen: People’s Public Security University of China
Yahua Wang: Tsinghua University

Policy Sciences, 2024, vol. 57, issue 4, No 6, 873 pages

Abstract: Abstract In policy diffusion research, considerable focus has been placed on the mechanisms and motivations underlying diffusion, yet there is a notable dearth of analysis linking the diffusion process with policy outcomes. This prompts an important inquiry: Who fares better in terms of policy outcomes—the pioneer or the late mover? Our study investigates China’s River Chief System policy and classifies cities as either pioneers, followers, or laggards according to their position in the diffusion process. Our quantitative analysis of 142 cities indicates that pioneers achieve the most favorable policy outcomes, while laggards are associated with the least favorable results. Further examination of the political incentives driving pioneer advantage suggests that pioneers are driven by political aspirations, followers are driven by political signaling, and laggards are driven by political pressure. This research deepens understanding of policy diffusion by elucidating the interplay between diffusion sequence and policy outcomes, and offers significant insights for policymakers aiming to formulate effective diffusion strategies.

Keywords: Policy diffusion; Policy outcome; S-shaped diffusion curve; Motivation; River chief system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11077-024-09560-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:policy:v:57:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11077-024-09560-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11077/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11077-024-09560-7

Access Statistics for this article

Policy Sciences is currently edited by Michael Howlett

More articles in Policy Sciences from Springer, Society of Policy Sciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().