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The Institutional Trust Paradox in Bangladesh

Steinar Askvik () and Ishtiaq Jamil ()

Public Organization Review, 2013, vol. 13, issue 4, 459-476

Abstract: This paper maps institutional trust in Bangladesh and analyzes to what extent citizens perceive public institutions to be trustworthy. According to a number of expert evaluations, public and political institutions in Bangladesh do not stand out as very trustworthy. Yet, despite such expert evaluations, recent survey data indicate that popular trust is quite high in certain major institutions such as the parliament and the central government. Since it is misplaced, the high level of popular institutional trust presents a paradox. It implies some kind of blind or naive trust, which may be dysfunctional for the emergence of a democratic governance system. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Trust; Trustworthiness; Public institutions; Bangladesh (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11115-013-0263-6

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