The Other Side of Ownership in Nonprofit Organizations: an Economic Rationale for Democracy
Claudio Balestri ()
Public Organization Review, 2014, vol. 14, issue 2, 187-199
Going beyond the deeply examined non-distribution constraint, which refers to the right to residual income, the paper investigates the other side of ownership, i.e. the right to residual control, to discover a general economic rationale for what we call “democracy”: a collective decision-making method based on the principles of equality and inclusiveness. The main result of the analysis is to point to the concept of perfect democracy as an efficient solution for the provision of public goods where other allocative mechanisms, such as the marketplace, fail. Copyright The Author(s) 2014
Keywords: Nonprofit Organizations; Public goods; Ownership rights; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:14:y:2014:i:2:p:187-199
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11115/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Public Organization Review is currently edited by Ali Farazmand
More articles in Public Organization Review from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().