Who is Appointed to What Position? The Politics of Appointment in Quangos of Korea
Sanghee Park () and
Byong Kim ()
Public Organization Review, 2014, vol. 14, issue 3, 325-351
This study identifies the determinants of appointment of executives in quangos. Using data from 85 quangos in Korea over 15 years between 1993 and 2007, we investigate the degree to which various characteristics of organizational actors affect the choice of executives. Three organizational actors include presidents, sponsoring government departments, and the concerned quangos. Although results vary by executive position, the findings of the empirical analysis with multinomial probit and generalized linear mixed models support the idea that the appointment of quango executives is not the result of presidential choice but that of the interactions among the key organizational actors, with different incentives and resources, on the appointment. Compared to former bureaucrats, presidential allies are more likely to be appointed when presidents have more political support from the National Assembly and it is easier for insiders to be promoted as executives from larger and older quangos with clear legal origins. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Keywords: Quangos; Executives; Politics of appointment; Patronage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:14:y:2014:i:3:p:325-351
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