The Effects of European Regulatory Networks on the Bureaucratic Autonomy of National Regulatory Authorities
Ole Danielsen () and
Kutsal Yesilkagit ()
Public Organization Review, 2014, vol. 14, issue 3, 353-371
This article discusses the effects of European regulatory networks on the bureaucratic autonomy of national regulators as regards regulatory rule-enforcement and rulemaking. Drawing on institutional theory, the article elaborates scope conditions for networks to yield an effect along this property and assesses these arguments in a study of the formation and institutionalization of the European Competition Network and how it structures relationships between competition authorities and resort ministries in The Netherlands, Sweden and the non-EU member-state Norway. It is argued that by virtue of accumulating and embedding strong norms of independence, the network yields an “autonomizing” effect vis-à-vis participating organizations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Keywords: European regulatory networks; National regulatory agencies; Bureaucratic autonomy; Multilevel antitrust enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:14:y:2014:i:3:p:353-371
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