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Public-Private Partnership Contractual Design: A Computational Model of the Moral Hazard with Lotteries

Rodrigo Nobre Fernandez (), Helton Saulo, André Carraro, Fabricio Tourrucôo and Ronald Hillbrecht
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Rodrigo Nobre Fernandez: Universidade Federal de Pelotas
Helton Saulo: Universidade Federal de Goiás
André Carraro: Universidade Federal de Pelotas
Fabricio Tourrucôo: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Ronald Hillbrecht: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Public Organization Review, 2018, vol. 18, issue 1, 39-51

Abstract: Abstract Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a new model of public management which consists of the contractual relationship between public and private entities. In particular, PPPs enable risk share between public and private sectors making the asymmetric information problem in a contractual arrangement more evident. The aim of this paper was to study a moral hazard problem applied to PPP contracts. To achieve this objective, a PPP computational contractual model including the moral hazard with lotteries was developed to assess how contractual changes could affect the optimum behavior of arrangement members. Simulations indicate that projects with higher economic value should attract more qualified firms, which may be why the companies expend more effort. To deal with possible contractual contingencies and try to minimize the moral hazard problem, the government could draw up more flexible contracts in order to include possible necessary changes and punish unwanted or improper consortium behavior.

Keywords: Public-private partnership; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard; Linear program algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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