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Agency Autonomy and Organizational Interaction

Helena Wockelberg () and Shirin Ahlbäck Öberg ()
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Helena Wockelberg: Uppsala University
Shirin Ahlbäck Öberg: Uppsala University

Public Organization Review, 2022, vol. 22, issue 4, No 10, 1045-1062

Abstract: Abstract This research contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between agency autonomy and organizational interaction. A comparative design that includes agency managers in Norway and Sweden describing organizational interaction, the measures used and their perceived quality, is applied. Based on observed significant country-related effects, a main conclusion is that strong formal and organizational safeguards of agency autonomy appear to produce positive views on organizational interaction. The unusually strong and clear boundaries that underpin the autonomy of Swedish central government agencies lowers the risks of interacting with others, protecting both turf and mandate.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:22:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11115-021-00551-3

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DOI: 10.1007/s11115-021-00551-3

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