Legislating from Both Sides of the Aisle: Information and the Value of Bipartisan Consensus

David Epstein

Public Choice, 1999, vol. 101, issue 1-2, 22 pages

Abstract: This paper motivates bipartisanship through a formal model in which committee members are assumed to possess policy expertise. Its central findings are: 1) bipartisan support for legislation is more informative than partisan support; 2) bipartisanship is preferred when the uncertainty surrounding outcomes is large and partisan policy differences are small; 3) "minority party gatekeeping" is possible when minority party members refuse to endorse majority party proposals; and 4) legislators with extreme preferences need minority party support to pass legislation. An equilibrium selection criterion is also introduced and applied to the model to predict under what conditions the majority party will seek bipartisan support. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
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