EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism

Matthias Wrede ()

Public Choice, 1999, vol. 101, issue 3-4, 177-93

Abstract: The paper deals with vertical tax competition between self-interested governments in a dynamic environment. In a federation, competition between the federal and the state governments arises when tax sources are not separated but pooled. Since dynamic inefficiencies will be stressed, the focus is on fiscal stock externalities rather than on flow externalities. The paper shows that the Leviathans in a federation tax the fiscal common resource more extensively than the single Leviathan in a unitary state. Furthermore, the positive impact of political stability on public consumption of the fiscal common will be discussed. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:101:y:1999:i:3-4:p:177-93

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-24
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:101:y:1999:i:3-4:p:177-93